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The Constitutionality of Requiring Use of
Husband's Name in Driver's License:
Whitlow v. Hodges
In Whitlow v. Hodges' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge to the un-
written Kentucky regulation requiring a married woman to receive her
driver's license in her husband's surname. The plaintiff had continued
to use her maiden name as her legal surname after marriage, and
argued that this was permissible under Kentucky law. The Sixth Cir-
cuit did not reject the assertion that under Kentucky law Whitlow
was entitled to continue to use her maiden name. Nevertheless, the
court held that the State of Kentucky could constitutionally require
that her driver's license be in her husband's name.
The facts in Whitlow are deceptively similar to those in the 1971
three-judge district court decision of Forbush v. Wallace2 which de-
nied a similar claim and was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. The Sixth Circuit's resolution of Whitlow without a determina-
tion of whether Kentucky law requires a married woman to take her
husband's surname when. she marries, however, fundamentally dis-
tinguishes the two cases.
The Sixth Circuit both applied incorrectly the deferential standard
of equal protection review it deemed appropriate and failed to recog-
nize that an intermediate standard of review was required because of
the sex-based classification under consideration. The application of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, viewed from a
historical perspective, has been shaped by an evolving cultural under-
standing regarding the legitimate roles of various social groups.
Rather than recognize the impact of that cultural evolution upon
Supreme Court precedent, the court allowed itself to be influenced
by the stereotyped views of women that still exist in our society.
That influence is evidenced not so much in what the court said, but
rather in the questions it failed to consider. The court's analytical
failure illustrates the continued impact of culturally determined sexism
upon constitutional analysis.
I. FORBUSH V. WALLACE
The plaintiffs claim in Forbush was similar to that in Whitlow.
Forbush challenged on equal protection grounds3 the constitutionality
1. 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 654 (1976).
2. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'dniem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
3. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part: "[Nlor
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of Alabama's unwritten regulation requiring a married woman to
receive an Alabama driver's license in her husband's surname. Un-
like the plaintiff in Whitlow,4 Forbush also challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Alabama common-law rule that upon marriage a
woman must take her husband's surname as her own. The three-
judge federal district court held that neither requirement violated
Forbush's fourteenth amendment rights. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed without an opinion.
The district court's opinion focused initially on the argument
against the validity of the unwritten Alabama regulation governing the
name to be used in applying for a license. In assessing the con-
stitutionality of that regulation the court applied the deferential stan-
dard of equal protection review.5  Addressing the deferential stan-
dard's requirement that the state action must have a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state interest, the court identified Alabama's
interest as one of "maintaining close watch over its licensees."
6
Having noted that "Alabama has adopted the common-law rule that
upon marriage the wife by operation of law takes the husband's sur-
name,"7 the court reasoned that "[t]he confusion which would result
if each driver were allowed to obtain licenses in any number of names
he desired is obvious. This would be true not only of the mainte-
nance of driving records, but also of the identification purposes to which a
license is put, whether traffic-related or otherwise."' Thus, the regula-
tion was found to have a rational relationship to the state's interest in
policing the administration of licenses and preserving the integrity of
the driver's license as a means of identification.
The court then considered the constitutionality of the common-law
rule requiring a woman to abandon her maiden name upon marriage.
In that context the court expressly articulated the deferential standard
of review: "[A] law is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite the existence of discrimination in the technical or broad sense,
where the law at issue maintains some rational connection with a
shall any State . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The prohibition extends to discriminatory state action in all forms; thus, in Forbush the equal
protection clause required scrutiny of both the common-law rule requiring a woman to assume
her husband's surname upon marriage and the unwritten regulation requiring a woman to apply
for a driver's license in her husband's surname.
4. Although Whitlow apparently did not challenge the constitutionality of the alleged
Kentucky common-law rule that a married woman must take her husband's surname, she did
argue that no such rule existed under Kentucky common law.
5. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: a Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Gunther indicates that the "def-
erential 'old' equal protection" was characterized by "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact."
6. 341 F. Supp. at 222.
7. Id. at 221. Note that at this point in its analysis the court was focusing on the consti-
tutionality of the regulation rather than that of the common-law rule.
8. Id. at 222.
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legitimate state interest."9  This deferential standard of review was
further evidenced by the district court's statement that "when a court
is presented with a challenge to a seemingly valid state law on equal
protection grounds, it must sustain that law if it can discern any
rational basis." 10
The state interests served by the common-law rule requiring
name change were "[u]niformity among the several states" with re-
gard to "the custom of the husband's surname denominating the
wedded couple," and "administrative convenience."" The common-
law rule that a woman must abandon her maiden name upon mar-
riage, therefore, also passed the deferential standard of review.
In reaching its conclusion the court in Forbush also focused on
the "simple, inexpensive means"12 by which a married woman could
change her name. The court apparently was noting the fact that
although a married woman lost her maiden name by operation of law
when she married, she could change her name back to her maiden name
by the use of the Alabama name-change statute. The availability of
this inexpensive remedy was a significant factor in the court's balanc-
ing of the potential administrative inconvenience and cost of a change
in procedure to the State of Alabama against the burden on the mem-
bers of the plaintifPs class. The name-change remedy thus served as
the basis for the court's conclusion that the injury to the plaintiff's
class, "if any, through the operation of the law is de minimis." 3 The
court accordingly concluded that the Alabama common-law rule re-
quiring a woman to take her husband's name as her own was not un-
constitutional.
II. WHITLOW V. HODGES
A. The Claim and its Disposition
Whitlow instituted a class action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. She alleged that the
Kentucky regulation requiring her to receive a driver's license in her
husband's surname despite the fact that she continued to use her
maiden name for all other purposes violated her fourteenth.amend-
ment right to equal protection under law.14 The district court, relying
wholly upon Forbush, dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the






14. There is no indication in the circuit court's opinion That Ms. Whitlow raised a dis-
tinct challenge to the constitutionality of the alleged Kentucky common-law rule requiring her
to take her husband's surname when she married.
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manded the case to the district court for its determination of whether
"Kentucky law, like that of Alabama, requires a woman to take her
husband's surname upon marriage." 15 As the circuit court indicated,
"most of the briefing of the parties and the attention of the court was
directed to,16 that question on the assumption that Forbush was
controlling only if Kentucky law was like that of Alabama. Upon
remand the district court decided that under the common law of Ken-
tucky a woman must abandon her maiden name upon marriage and
assume her husband's surname. "The district judge accordingly de-
termined that the two cases [Whitlow and Forbush] were identical
and once more entered an order of dismissal of the complaint." 7
In an effort to escape the conclusive authority of Forbush, Whit-
low made a second appeal to the Sixth Circuit to challenge the district
court's interpretation of the Kentucky common law and again argued
that Kentucky law did permit a married woman to use her maiden name
as her legal name.'8 On the second appeal, however, the circuit court
rejected its earlier assumption and concluded that a determination of
the requirements of Kentucky law was not necessary. The court rea-
soned:
[W]e need not determine with finality that the challenged regulation is
consistent with the common law of Kentucky, a question which we be-
lieve upon the existing state of the law in Kentucky is better left to more
definite resolution by the courts of Kentucky. Instead, while Forbush
is no doubt reinforced by such a finding under the common law of Ala-
bama, we read its primary thrust as directed to the question of whether
the challenged regulation has a rational connection with a legitimate
state interest. 9
In answering the question of whether the regulation challenged by
Whitlow had a rational connection with a legitimate state interest, the
majority asserted that "Forbush denied the same claim now being
urged by plaintiff in the instance case."'  That cryptic assertion,
however, was an inadequate substitute for genuine analysis of the rele-
vant precedent as applied to these facts.
B. The Rationale
Can the rationale of Forbush be applied fully and without varia-
15. 539 F.2d at 583.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Among states where the issue has been litigated, Maryland, Ohio, and Wisconsin al.
low a married woman to continue to use her maiden name. See Stuart v. Board of Elections, 266
Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972); State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 NE. 2d
616 (1961); State ex reL Bucher v. Brower, 21 Ohio Op. 208 (C.P. Montgomery Cty. 1941), In re
Kruzel, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).




tion to the facts of Whitlow? In addressing this question it will be
assumed arguendo at this point in the analysis that the deferential
standard of review was appropriately employed by the circuit court.2'
The state interests served in Forbush by the regulation requiring a
married woman to apply for her driver's license in her legal name,
which under Alabama law was her husband's surname, should be
considered first. The regulation was found to have a rational rela-
tionship to both the state interest in policing the administration of the
issuance of licenses and the state interest in preserving the integrity
of the license as a means of identification. According to the Whitlow
majority those interests are similarly furthered under the facts in that
case. An examination of the facts reveals, however, that Kentucky's
interest in preserving the integrity of the driver's license as a means of
identification cannot possibly be furthered if Kentucky law permits a
married woman to retain her maiden name as her legal name after she
marries. It would be repugnant to the interest of preserving the
integrity of the driver's license as a means of identification to require
an individual to use a name other than the one by which she is legally
identified for all other purposes. Nonetheless, by refusing to de-
termine that Kentucky common law required a woman to assume her
husband's surname upon marriage,22 the majority opinion in Whitlow
necessarily implied that a state regulation requiring a married woman
to use her husband's surname on her driver's license rationally relates
to the legitimate state interests outlined in Forbush even though her
legal name is her maiden name and she has made "a showing that
for all other purposes [she] continue[s] to use her maiden name.'2 3
The dissent concluded:
Mistakenly following Forbush, the majority opinion would hold that
Kentucky, which requires a driver to be licensed in his legal name, can
rationally require persons in plaintiffs class to be issued licenses in names
which under state law are not their legal names and by which they have
never been known. Accordingly, the state interests found to be de-
terminative in Forbush ...cannot possibly be served by requiring a
class of drivers to be issued license in names which are not their legal
names, and by which they are not and have never been known. 4
The pursuit of administrative efficiency and the prevention of fraud
in the use of driver's licenses are unquestionably legitimate state in-
terests.25 The analytical failure of Whitlow arises, however, from the
21. The appropriate standard of review is discussed in notes 45-69 infra and accompanying
text.
22. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
23. 539 F.2d at 583.
24. Id. at 585 (McCree, J., dissenting).
25. After correctly noting that the state interest in preserving the integrity of the driver's
license as a means of identification cannot possibly be furthered if plaintiffs legal name is her
maiden name, the dissent assumes that the state interest in administrative convenience like-
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circuit court's utter disregard of the relationship between the regula-
tion and the interest sought to be achieved. The deferential standard
requires that the state action must rationally relate to the interest
sought to be achieved.26 The state interest in preserving the driver's
license as a means of identification cannot possibly be furthered by
requiring women "to be issued licenses in names which under state
law are not their legal names and by which they have never been
known.,
27
The majority's illogic continued in a reference to the recently
amended 28 Kentucky name-change statute, which, "like [the law] of
Alabama, affords a simple and inexpensive means of changing one's
name." 29  As noted earlier, the majority had not determined that
under Kentucky law a woman was unable to continue to use her maid-
en name after she married.30 Assuming that Kentucky would allow a
woman to retain her maiden name, the court's reference to the name
change statute suggests that members of plaintiff's class should
"change" their name to what it already is. Carrying the majority's
rationale to that extreme, a married female applicant could then still
be told that she must apply for and receive her driver's license in her
husband's surname.3
It is doubtful, however, that the majority would allow the State
of Kentucky to require Whitlow to apply in her husband's surname if
she had actually employed the name-change statute.32 That is, if her
wise cannot be furthered. The state could legitimately argue, however, that it is still administra-
tively more convenient to conclusively presume that the legal name of any married woman is
the same as her husband's. In tracing the ownership of a family car, for example, it may be
easier for the state to assume that every husband and wife share the same last name. Applying
the deferential standard of review, absent any special sensitivity to the impropriety of using sex
as a classifying factor, the regulation arguably does further the ,tate's interest in administra-
tive factors. But see Comment, The Right of Women To Use their Maiden Names, 38 Atti.
L. REv. 105 (1973), in which it is suggested that the increasing use of computer technology
in matters of identification diminishes the state's need to rely on names.
The entire matter of administrative convenience in the context of sex-based classilica-
tions, however, has been rendered largely academic. The Supreme Court has held that ad-
ministrative factors alone are a constitutionally inadequate justification for disparate treatment
of men and women solely on the basis of their sex. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), This
authority was completely ignored in Whitlow. Reed and its progeny are discussed in notes 45-69
infra and accompanying text.
26. See also Perry, Constitutional "Fairness". Notes on Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess, 73 VA. L. REv.-(forthcoming 1977).
27. 539 F.2d at 585 (dissenting opinion).
28. In a footnote to the opinion the majority indicated: "Significantly KRS § 401.010 was
amended in 1974 by deleting an exception to the name change statute in the case of married
women." 539 F.2d at 583.
29. Id.
30. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
31. This result would theoretically follow from the majority's conclusion that it is rational
for the state to require a married woman to apply in her husband's surname regardless of
whether or not that is her legal name.
32. The court's reference to the name change statute makes sense only if the court means
to suggest that the result would be different if she had applied for the driver's license subse-
quent to her use of the statute.
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maiden name were legally hers as a result of having used the statute,
she could receive her driver's license in her legal name. The court
neglected, however, to provide any explanation of why Whitlow should
not be able to apply in her maiden name if she had never taken her
husband's name in the first place. If it would be irrational for the
state to require her to apply for a driver's license in her husband's
surname after she had "changed" her legal name to her maiden name,
it is similarly irrational for the state to require her to apply in her
husband's surname if her legal name had always been her maiden
name.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. An Overview
The analysis of Whitlow has thus far assumed arguendo that the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' application of the deferential standard
of review was proper. In employing this standard, however, the court
completely ignored the significant doctrinal changes that had occurred
after Forbush was decided. Had the court in Whitlow applied the ap-
propriate standard of review, it would have found a violation of Whit-
low's right of equal protection under law.
Traditionally, equal protection doctrine was characterized by a
rigid two-tiered approach.3 3  A showing of impact upon some funda-
mental interest 34 or suspect class 35 warranted the application of strict
judicial scrutiny. Absent such a showing, the deferential standard was
appropriate in all other contexts, including classification on the basis
of sex. Both the deferential and strict standards of equal protection
review involve a distinct consideration of both the purpose of the chal-
lenged law or regulation and the means chosen to achieve that purpose.
Consider first the requirements regarding the purpose of the law or
regulation. While the deferential standard requires only that the law
serve a legitimate state interest-one within the broad sweep of the
police power-strict scrutiny requires that the law serve a compelling
state interest.36  With regard to the means chosen to achieve that
purpose, the deferential standard requires only that the law or regula-
tion rationally relate to the interest sought to be achieved.37 Strict
33. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 8.
34. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). in which the Court struck
down a poll tax, the payment of which was a precondition for voting.
35. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), for an example of alienage as a sus-
pect classification warranting strict judicial scrutiny. But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96
S. Ct. 1895 (1976).
36. For the classic formulation of the strict scrutiny standard of review, see Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a more recent statement of the standard, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
37. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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scrutiny requires, however, that the law or regulation must do more
than relate to that purpose; it must be necessary to the achievement
of the compelling state interest.
Recent Supreme Court decisions employing an intermediate de-
gree of scrutiny, however, indicate a growing dissatisfaction with the
traditional two-tiered approach. 3s The intermediate standard of re-
view now employed in the context of sex-based classification is one
indication of this developing standard. The Whitlow court did not
consider the controlling precedent requiring this intermediate stan-
dard of review and, as a consequence, reached an erroneous conclu-
sion.
B. The Doctrinal Evolution of Sex-Based
Discrimination Review
Before considering the doctrinal developments regarding the
standard of review in sex-based classification contexts, it is worthwhile
to understand the traditional view of sex-based classifications." As
recently as 1948, the United States Supreme Court in Goesart v.
Cleary4° sustained the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that in
effect forbade "any female to act as a bartender unless she be 'the
wife or daughter of the male owner' of a licensed liquor establish-
ment.",41 In answering a claim that the state's disparate treatment of
men and women was a violation of the equal protection clause the
Court applied the deferential standard. It found a legitimate purpose
in the legislative judgment that "bartending by women may . . . give
rise to moral and social problems. 42  Because the statute precluded
most women from being bartenders, it had a rational relationship to
the legitimate state interest: "[T]he line [the state has] drawn is not
without a basis in reason. . . . An indication of the Supreme
Court's perception of the validity of sex discrimination claims under
the equal protection clause is indicated by the following comment:
"To ask whether or not the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment barred Michigan from making the classi-
38. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 17.
39. The state has used sex as a classifying factor when it has imposed a burden or dis.
tributed a benefit on the basis of the gender characteristic. The clearest example of the use ol
sex as a classifying factor exists when the state expressly employs gender-related language in
a statute. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73 (1971), the statut. provided: "Of several persons
claiming and equally entitled . . . to administer, males must be preferred to females, and rcht-
tives of the whole to those of the half blood."
40. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
41. Id. at 464.
42. Id. at 466.
43. Id. at 467.
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fication the State has made . . . is one of those rare instances where
to state the question is in effect to answer it. '
4
The Supreme Court's doctrinal departure from the deferential
standard in the context of sex-based classifications began in 1971 with
Reed v. Reed.45  The Court considered an equal protection chal-
lenge to an Idaho statute that mandated "preference to the male can-
didate over the female, each being otherwise 'equally entitled' ,46
to appointment as administrator of the estate of their deceased adopted
son. In upholding the constitutionality of the preference scheme the
Supreme Court of Idaho had conceded that "the preference given to
males . . . is 'mandatory' and leaves no room for the exercise of a
probate court's discretion in the appointment of administrators.4 7
The objectives of the statute, according to the Idaho Supreme Court,
were administrative efficiency and the avoidance of intrafamily contro-
versy." In addressing the deferential standard's requirement that
the means chosen must rationally relate to these state objectives the
Idaho court reasoned: "This provision of the statute is neither an illogi-
cal nor arbitrary method devised by the legislature to resolve an issue
that would otherwise require a hearing as to the relative merits as to
which of the two or more petitioning relatives should be appointed. 49
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the mandatory
preference for males was found by a unanimous Court to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court did
not dispute the Idaho court's determination that the objective of the
statute was to avoid intrafamily controversy and thus to further admin-
istrative efficiency. "Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on
probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some
legitimacy." 50  Nevertheless, the standard of review employed by the
Supreme Court resulted in a determination that the statute was un-
constitutional.
What in fact was that standard of review? Sex was not explicitly
raised to the level of a suspect class, and no effort was made to
analogize sex to race. The Court purported to apply the deferential
standard of review: "The question presented by this case, then, is
whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of
administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that
is sought to be advanced by the operation of [the statute]."51 Ac-
44. Id. at 465.
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. Id. at 73.
47. Id. at 74.
48. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
49. Id.
50. 404 U.S. at 76.
51. Id.
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cording to one commentator, however, the result reached suggests
that
some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into
the analysis. Clear priority classifications are plainly relevant to
the State's interest in reducing administrative disputes .... Only
by importing some special suspicion of sex-related means from the
new equal protection area can the result be made entirely per-
suasive. 2
Despite the Court's failure in Reed to adequately explain either the
nature of the standard of review employed or the constitutional basis
for the special sensitivity to sex-based classifications, Reed at least
stands for the proposition that the objective of administrative con-
venience, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain the disparate treat-
ment of men and women solely on the basis of their sex.
The Supreme Court's doctrinal evolution regarding the appro-
priate standard of review in sex-based discrimination cases continued
in 1973 with Frontiero v. Richardson.5 3  The plaintiff, a married fe-
male member of the armed services, challenged on fifth amendment
due process grounds54 a congressional scheme promulgated to attract
career personnel through reenlistment by providing increased allow-
ances for quarters, and medical and dental benefits for members' de-
pendents.
The problem arose because a serviceman may claim his wife as a 'de-
pendent' without regard to whether she is in fact dependent upon him
for any part of her support. . . . A servicewoman, on the other hand,
may not claim her husband as a 'dependent' under these programs un-
less he is in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.1
5
The plaintiff asserted that the statutes were discriminatory in two re-
spects:
[F]irst, as a procedural matter, a female member is required to demon-
strate her spouse's dependency, while no such burden is imposed upon
male members; and, second, as a substantive matter, a male member
who does not provide more than one-half of his wife's support receives
benefits, while a similarly situated female member is denied such bene-
fits.56
52. Gunther, supra note 5, at 34.
53. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
54. Id. at 680 n.5: "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it
does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustiflable as to be violative of due process.' Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964)." In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)
the Court again indicated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment: "This Court's
approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as
to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." But see Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976).
55. 411 U.S. at 678-79.
56. Id. at 680.
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In finding the statutory scheme constitutionally invalid four members
of the Court57 concluded, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." s According to the
Brennan opinion, a legislative classification on the basis of sex must
therefore be necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest.
Since Frontiero, a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to hold
that sex is a suspect class triggering strict scrutiny. 9 Because of the
Court's failure to provide a more precise standard of review, the hold-
ing in Reed, as interpreted in subsequent cases, is crucial to the de-
termination of what standard of review is required in the context of
sex-based classification. Although the four justices joining in the
Brennan opinion in Frontiero found at least implicit support in Reed
for treating sex as a suspect class, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Blackmun argued that Reed "did not add sex to the nar-
rowly limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect.'"6
0
That the Court has split on the issue of what label to attach to
the degree of scrutiny employed in Reed, however, should not over-
shadow or confuse what had been agreed upon. By joining in the
judgment of reversal on the authority of Reed, the concurring justices,
although refusing to treat sex as a suspect class, demonstrated that
the Reed standard was not the traditional deferential standard. Al-
though the concurring Justices did not expressly articulate the measure
of scrutiny that rendered the congressional scheme in Frontiero un-
constitutional, the result reached indicates even more persuasively
than did the Reed result that the standard of review actually employed
in reviewing sex-based classifications was more exacting than that
utilized under the usual deferential standard. As in Reed, absent
some special sensitivity to the use of sex-based classifications the
congressional scheme would normally have been viewed as bearing a
rational relationship to the government's interest in administrative
convenience. The three-judge district court had noted:
57. The four members were Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall. Justice
Stewart concurred in a one-sentence opinion citing Reed. Justices Powell, Blackmun and
Chief Justice Burger also concurred in a separate opinion which differed sharply from the Bren-
nan opinion with respect to both the meaning of Reed and the appropriate standard of review
in the context of sex-based classification: "It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to charac-
terize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding."
411 U.S. at 691-92 (concurring opinion).
58. 411 U.S. at 688.
59. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
60. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The classification which establishes a conclusive presumption in favor
of married servicemen claiming wives allows the uniformed services to
carry out these statutory purposes with a considerable saving of ad-
ministrative expense and manpower. Congress apparently reached the
conclusion that it would be more economical to require married female
members claiming husbands to prove actual dependency than to extend
the presumption of dependency to such members.
6 1
The concurring Justices, therefore, did not and could not dispute the
proposition that the degree of scrutiny employed, in Reed and in their
Frontiero analysis was more exacting than that required under the
traditional deferential standard of review.
In its most recent decision, Craig v. Boren,62 the Supreme Court
further articulated the standard of review required by Reed:
To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives. Thus, in Reed, the objectives of 'reducing the workload on pro-
bate courts.' . . . and 'avoiding intra-family controversy,' . . . were
deemed of insufficient importance to sustain use of an overt gender cri-
terion in the appointment of intestate administrators. Decisions fol-
lowing Reed similarly have rejected administrative ease and convenience
as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifica-
tions.
61
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Powell, while indicating "reser-
vations as to some of the discussion concerning the appropriate stan-
dard for equal protection analysis," agreed that "Reed and subse-
quent cases involving gender-based classifications make clear that the
Court subjects such classifications to a more critical examination than
is normally applied when fundamental constitutional rights and 'sus-
pect classes' are not present. 64  In a footnote to this discussion Mr.
Justice Powell continued:
61. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (footnote omitted),
62. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). The plaintiffs in Craig were a male between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one and a vendor of 3.2% beer who alleged that the Oklahoma statute permitting
the sale of 3.2% to women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one but not to men of the
same age, denied them the equal protection of the laws. Because the appellant Craig had
turned twenty-one after the Court noted probable jurisdiction, the controversy was mooted as to
him. The Court determined, however, that the appellant vendor had standing to make the equal
protection claim. The Court held that "the gender-based differential contained in 37 Okla,
Stat. § 245 constitutes a denial of the Equal Protection of the Laws to males aged 18-20
(footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). In referring to Reed and subsequent cases the Court did
not articulate a rationale for distinguishing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Schle-
singer v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). In those cases the Court appeared to apply the defer.
ential standard in reviewing governmental practices which remedied the effects of past discrimi-
nation, that is, ameliorative classifications. For a discussion of the legitimacy of applying
minimal scrutiny in the ameliorative context and stricter scrutiny in the nonameliorative con-
text, see Comment, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975
DUKE L.J. 163. The state regulation in Whitlow does not evidence an ameliorative classifica-
tion.
64. 97 S.Ct. at 463-64 (Powell, J., concurring).
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As has been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be
viewed by some as a 'middle-tier' approach. While I would not en-
dorse that characterization and would not welcome a further sub-
dividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition
that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review
normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-
based classification. So much is clear from our recent cases.
65
This intermediate standard has proved problematic for the lower
courts. One federal district judge, unaided by the recent decision
in Craig, candidly remarked that it is "somewhat difficult to surmise
what the appropriate standard of review in this case should be."
66
Although the standard is vague, the Whitlow court's failure to even
address the issue of the appropriate standard of review is an unjustifi-
able oversight, unworthy of the serious constitutional issue facing the
court.
Thus, the holding of Whitlow is erroneous in view of the Reed in-
termediate standard of review. 67  The state interests purportedly
furthered by the Kentucky regulation were the preservation of the in-
tegrity of the driver's license as a means of identification and adminis-
trative efficiency. The first interest cannot possibly be furthered by
requiring a woman to apply for a driver's license in a name that is not
her own. The interest in administrative convenience, assuming argu-
endo that it is plausibly furthered, 68 is simply an inadequate justifica-
tion for classification on the basis of sex after Reed and subsequent
cases. A proper application of Reed would require a finding of un-
constitutionality under the equal protection clause on these facts. For,
as stated in Frontiero, "any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line
between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative
65. Id. at 464 n.I.
66. Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854, 861 (D.R.I. 1973).
67. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Forbush came after Reed. and thus one
could argue that Reed was not controlling on the facts in Wilgiow. This argument, however,
presents several problems. First, the argument does not recognize the fundamental distinction
between Forbush and Whidow. As was noted earlier, unlike the district court in Forbush.
the Whidow majority did not first determine that Kentucky law required a woman to take her
husband's surname.
Second, although the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Forbush in 1972 came after
Reed, the district court's opinion relied upon by the Whidtlow court was written without the
benefit of Reed. Thus, although Reed was soon to hold that the objective of administrative
efficiency was an impermissible basis for classification on the basis of sex, the Forbush district
court could still write that "[a]dministrative factors have often been considered rational bases
for challenged statutes." 341 F. Supp. at 222 n.2.
Third, the full significance of Reed was not apparent when Forbush was summarily af-
firmed. The Court had not yet decided Frontiero, which made clear that the degree of scrutiny
employed in Reed was more exacting than the usual deferential standard. Thus, although
"lower courts are bound by the summary decisions" of the Supreme Court, 539 F.2d at 584, the
court in Whitlow was not bound by a summary affirmance that was factually distinguishable and
was decided prior to a fundamental change in the degree of scrutiny employed in the review of
sex-based classification.
68. See note 25 supra.
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convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and
women who are . . . similarly situated,' and therefore involves the
'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitu-
tion]. .. , ,69
IV. CULTURAL NORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Background
Constitutional law has not been immune to the impact of evolv-
ing cultural norms regarding the appropriate roles of various social
groups. Commenting on Brown v. Board of Education"° in a later
case, Justice Douglas wrote:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have
never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of" what was at a given
time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. . . . Notions of
what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change. This Court in 1896 held that laws providing for
separate public facilities for white and Negro citizens did not deprive
the latter of the equal protection and treatment that the Fourteenth
Amendment commands. . . . Seven of the eight Justices then sitting
subscribed to the Court's opinion, thus joining in expressions of what
constituted unequal and discriminatory treatment that sound strange to
a contemporary ear. When, in 1954-more than a half-century later-
we repudiated the 'separate-but-equal' doctrine of Plessy as re-
spects public education we stated: 'In approaching this problem, we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.' 7'
The application of the equal protection clause in the racial context,
then, is a function of the way the definition of racism is evolving in
our society.
The relationship between changing cultural norms and equal pro-
tection doctrine in the context of classifications based upon sex par-
allels that of racial classifications. In the 1873 case of Bradwell v.
Illinois72 the Supreme Court was faced with a fourteenth amendment
challenge to the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to admit a woman to
69. 411 U.S. at 690. A thorough critique of the Forbush conclusion sustaining the con-
stitutionality of the Alabama common-law rule requiring name change is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is submitted, however, that the state interests served by that common-law rule, cu-
tom and administrative, convenience, are constitutionally inadequate justifications alter Rccd
and its progeny. Most forms of sex discrimination not only sere custom, they are an expres-
sion of custom. To argue that sex-based classifications are constitutionally permissible because
they further custom is merely another way of stating that it is permissible to discriminate be-
cause the discrimination has continued for many years. The logic is not persuasive, More-
over, as noted earlier, Reed made clear that administrative convenience is no longer a sullicient
justification for classification on the basis of sex.
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) (footnotes omitted),
72. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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the practice of law in that state. The extent of the transformation of
our normative values as a culture, and the Supreme Court's participa-
tion in that evolution, is indicated by a comparison of the Bradwell
opinion with some of more recent vintage. In upholding the constitu-
tionality of the exclusion of women from the practice of law the Court
explained:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance,
as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong,
or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.7
In sharp contrast to Bradwell, the Brennan opinion in Frontiero
expressly noted the evolution in our collective perception of the role
of women:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and un-
fortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimina-
tion was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which,
in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. 4
As evidence of the degree to which this paternalistic attitude had be-
come "so firmly rooted in our national consciousness"7 5 the Frontiero
opinion included the passage quoted above from the Bradwell opinion.
The opinion continued:
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and,
indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under
the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. And
although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were
denied even that right-which is itself 'preservative of other basic civil
and political rights'-until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half
a century later.
This historical similarity between the disadvantaged position of blacks
and women was a crucial factor in Justice Brennan's determination
that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
73. Id. at 141.
74. 411 U.S. at 684 (footnote omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id at 685 (footnote omitted).
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race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."" Although recent
decisions raise serious doubts about the prospects that a majority of
the Court will elevate sex to the status of other suspect classes," the
recognition of evolving cultural norms in the intermediate level of
scrutiny is clear.
B. Whitlow Reconsidered
The Whitlow opinion can be appropriately reconsidered in the
light of these evolving cultural norms and their impact upon equal
protection analysis. The significance of the majority's approach lies
not in its meager analysis, but rather, in the questions it failed to
consider and the reasons for that failure. The majority's approach
reflects a regrettable inability to guard against the traditional cul-
tural biases affecting its analysis and a failure to recognize the impact
of evolving cultural norms in the controlling precedent.
As indicated earlier, the Whitlow majority completely ignored
the intermediate standard of review required by Reed and its prog-
eny. 79 This failure to consider the controlling precedent is especially
surprising in light of the Sixth Circuit's prior recognition that the in-
termediate standard should be employed in sex discrimination cases."
A conceivable explanation for this failure may be that the major-
ity also failed to consider whether Whitlow's claim actually involved
a sex-based classification. Although the issue of what constitutes a
sex-based classification has been difficult to resolve in other factual
contexts,8' it is indisputable that in Whitlow the state had classified
77. Id. at 688.
78. See cases cited in note 59 supra.
79. See text beginning at note 45 supra.
80. See Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 51, 54 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975):
In recent years the Court appears to have moved away from the rigidity of these two
tests [the deferential standard and strict scrutiny] and to be evolving a newer standard
of review requiring somewhat more than a rational basis and less than a compelling
governmental interest to sustain certain classifications. This view standard focuses up-
on the means used to effect the end.
The court then cited Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). as an example of the intermediate stan-
dard of review.
81. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in %hich the Court held that the
State of California could constitutionally exclude pregnancy from the broad range of disabilities
covered by its disability insurance system. The Court attemp.ed to distinguish Reed and
Frontiero as
involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance pro-
gram does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities,
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in Reed . . . and Frontiero.
Id. at 496 n.20.
The Court recently reaffirmed the significance of this language by focusing upon "gender
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on the basis of sex. The unwritten regulation required married wom-
en "to make application for and receive a motor vehicle operator's
license in the surname of her husband despite a showing that for all
other purposes the woman has continued to use her maiden name." 2
A man, married or single, may apply for and receive a driver's license
in his legal name. A woman, however, must apply for and receive a
driver's license in her husband's surname even if that is not her legal
name. It would be difficult to find a more clear-cut example of classi-
fication on the basis of sex. 83
It is also conceivable that the court's analytical failure grew out
of its unconsidered approach to the interest Whitlow sought to pro-
tect.84  Is a woman's interest in retaining her maiden name upon
marriage or in applying for a driver's license in that name of any real
significance? 5 Before approaching that question, consider the man-
ner in which our nation's evolving definition of racism enables us to
see now the absurdity of an earlier Supreme Court view of a black
person's interest in avoiding forced segregation.
The classic formulation of the separate-but-equal doctrine ap-
peared in Plessy v. Ferguson,86 in which the Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to a Louisiana law requiring equal but separate
accommodations for white and black railroad passengers. 87  Address-
ing the legitimacy of a black person's interest in integrated railroad
transportation, the Court reasoned:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is
as such" inGeneral Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). In i1zidow, Kentucky has
classified on the basis of "gender as such."
82. 539 F.2d at 583.
83. In Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, (M.D. Ala. 1971). q'd nwm.. 405 U.S. 970
(1972), the court noted: "Thus, we are faced with a similar question of whether a state may
impose a burden on one sex that it does not place on the other."
84. Mr. Justice Marshall has persuasively argued:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum
of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with
which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the rec-
ognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. See generally, Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 779 (1973); MacDougall, The Right of Women to Determine Their Own Names Irre-
spective of Marital Status, I FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4005 (Dec. 10, 1974); Comment, The Right of
Women to Use Their Maiden Names, 38 ALB. L. REv. 105 (1973); Statutory Development.
Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption and Reregistration Statutes, 74 CoLt, I. L. REV. 1503
(1974); Comment, Women's Name Rights, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 876 (1976); Comment, The Right
of a Married Woman to Use Her Birth-Given Surname for Voter Registration. 32 MD. L. REV.
409 (1973); Comment, A Woman's Right To Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 665 (1973).
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87. Id. at 540.
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not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it."8
To focus solely on the absurdity of that view, however, is to avoid the
important lesson that can be discerned from this facet of constitutional
history. The judiciary is riot immune from the impact of culturally
shared normative values. It is the very nature of cultural bias that
the interest sought to be advanced will, when first considered, ap-
pear insignificant or unworthy of serious constitutional consideration.
The Supreme Court's immersion in our nation's nineteenth century
racism had allowed it to conclude that forced segregation was evil
only because blacks chose to define it in that light.
Our perception, then, of a married woman's interest in maintain-
ing an independent social and legal identity by retaining her maiden
name should be aided by a recognition that the societal majority's
perception of the importance of a minority interest is often disparag-
ing. Thus, in light of Plessy, it should not be surprising when it is
argued that a mandatory change of name is discriminatory only be-
cause a few women choose to view it as such.
One commentator has suggested that "[u]ntil there is the acknowl-
edgment that the right to retain a maiden name symbolizes many
principles inherent in the movement of women's rights, maiden names
will continue to be thought of as an insignificant problem within the
larger framework of sex discrimination."' 9 What exactly is the sym-
bolic function of a maiden name?
The married woman in modern America who wishes to retain her
maiden name, or to use the title Ms. instead of Mrs., is generally
making, and is understood by most people to be making, a statement
that she rejects certain aspects of the traditional female role or stereo-
type. She appears to be stating that it is her wish to be considered as
an individual, in her own right, and that she does not choose to be de-
fined in terms of her relationship with another person. No matter how
important such a relationship may be, she does not feel that it should
define her identity.90
Regardless of whether most women would prefer to retain their maid-
en names, or whether one personally agrees with the motivation for
such an effort, the matter is of paramount significance for those wom-
en who do desire to maintain that name as a symbol of personal
autonomy.
The reasoning implicit in this desire to use the maiden name as
a symbol of autonomy is understandable in light of historical justifica-
88. Id. at 551.
89. Comment, The Right of Women To Use Their Maiden Names, 38 ALB. L. Rtv. 105,
124 (1973).




tions for requiring a woman to abandon her own name upon marriage.
The common-law rule that a woman take her husband's surname as
her legal name developed
as an outgrowth of the judicial doctrine of coverture which decreed that
a married woman had no legal identity apart from that of her husband.
This doctrine was based on the fiction that husband and wife are one.
That 'one' was deemed to be the husband. The married woman, or
femme covert, lacked the capacity to contract, to sue or be sued, or to
possess or control property. To reflect the merger of her separate
identity into that of her husband, the law conferred her husband's name
upon her.91
The adoption of the Married Women's Acts alleviated many of these
barriers, but "left unaffected the practice that symbolized that unity:
the rule that upon marriage the wife takes her husband's name."92
V. CONCLUSION
Some married women wish to retain their maiden names as a
symbol of their rejection of the traditional legal status accorded wom-
en and as a symbol of their own personal autonomy in the marital
relationship. Although the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Whitlow v.
Hodges does not indicate whether Whitlow had retained her maiden
name for this reason, the court's rejection of her claim is a serious
setback to women who desire the freedom to make that choice.
The court's conclusion is especially troublesome because of its
failure to ground the decision on a common-law rule requiring a woman
to assume her husband's surname. The court refused to determine
whether Kentucky required abandonment of the maiden name upon
marriage and implicitly suggested, therefore, that Whitlow's maiden
name might be legally hers under Kentucky law. Nevertheless, the
court held that the State of Kentucky could constitutionally require
Whitlow to receive her driver's license in her husband's surname.
In reaching this decision the court merely assumed that the ra-
tionale of Forbush v. Wallace could be applied to the instant case.
A cursory examination of that rationale, however, reveals that Ken-
tucky's interest in preserving the integrity of the driver's license as a
means of identification cannot possibly be furthered by requiring
women to apply for drivers' licenses in names that are not their own.
The court also failed to evaluate the precedential value of Forbush in
light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions that require the applica-
tion of an intermediate level of scrutiny in the context of sex-based
classifications.
Rather than recognize the impact of our culture's evolving atti-
91. Id. at 666 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id. at 667 (footnote omitted).
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tude concerning the legitimate roles of women upon Supreme Court
precedent, 93 the Sixth Circuit apparently assumed that the interest
Whitlow sought to protect was unworthy of serious constitutional
consideration. It is not inconceivable that years from now this case
will be read as social historians now read Pless'. The subtlety of
cultural bias is so powerful that a male-dominated federal court has
refused to strike down state action requiring women to be identified
through their relationships to men. It is indeed ironic that such a de-
cision should occur after a fundamental change in equal protection
doctrine concerning classifications on the basis of sex. If that doc-
trine had been carefully considered, the result would necessarily
have been different.
David IV. Alexander
93. The impact of evolving normative roles upon equal protection analysis was again evi-
denced in Califano v. Goldfarb, 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (1977). which was decided after completion
of this Case Comment. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell concluded that the pro-
vision of the Social Security Act which required widowers but not widows to prove actual de-
pendency in order to qualify for survivor's benefits after the spouse's death violated lemale wage
earner's right to equal protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment due process clause by
providing less protection for their families than for the familks of male workers, .lustice
Stevens, concurring in the judgment, concluded that the statutory scheme worked an tin-
constitutional discrimination against male spouses, rather than against deceased lemale wage
earners. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan noted that the gender-based disparity in
treatment "is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial
justifications than 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations . . . or 'old notions' . . . that are
more consistent with 'the role-typing society has long imposed' . . , than with contemporary
reality." Id. at 4239 (citations omitted).
